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Martin: The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment--The Fourth Phase

THE SUPREME COURT AND LOCAL
REAPPORTIONMENT-THE FOURTH
PHASE
PHILIP L. MARTIN*

In 1962 when the Supreme Court abandoned its precedent of classifying legislative representation as a political question subject to the
doctrine of judicial self-restraint, there was no indication as to what
governments might be affected. 1 Two years later when the famous "one
man, one vote" rule was announced for congressional districts2 and
state legislatures,' the question of local governments' inclusion was still
unanswered. Localities would have to wait three more years, a period
of agonizing confusion and doubt, before the Supreme Court would
make its first ruling on the status of local legislative representation. In
no respect has the judiciary's uncertainty toward reapportionment been
more conspicuous than in the area of local government whose record
after June 7, 1971, now consists of four phases, and there are still a
number of crucial questions which remain unanswered. Despite considerable progress in achieving numerical equality, the Court's response
to the quest for legislative equity has been otherwise disappointing
because of its piecemeal formulation of guidelines. As a result the
decisions made so far leave unresolved many of the basic conflicts
inherent in attaining any degree of the contemporary but highly idealistic concept of participatory democracy. As this paper examines the
fourth stage of the reapportionment story, one should, therefore, bear
in mind the warning made by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent against
entering the "political thicket." He contended that "even assuming the
indispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the part of judges in such
matters, they do not have the accepted legal standards or criteria or
even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial judgments." 4
Yet, any criticism of the Supreme Court's standard on reapportionment must realistically consider the fact that it was legislative abnega* The author is presently Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute. He holds a B.S. from Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and an M.A. and a Ph.D.
from the University of North Carolina. Prof. Martin has published numerous articles
in law journals.
I. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (dissenting opinion) (1962).
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tion of responsibility which necessitated judicial involvement in what
is by nature essentially a political problem. This qualification will,
perhaps, excuse some of the judicial shortsightedness evident in the
cases to be examined.
The Aftermath of Reynolds

Although the decision of Reynolds v. Sinis only affected state
legislatures, it was generally assumed that the requirement of "one

man, one vote" applied as well to the subdivisions of a state. However,
since the Supreme Court had not ruled on the subject, some extreme
interpretations were made in applying the Reynolds principle to local
government. 6 For example, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a lower
state court's definition of numerical equality and ruled instead that
factors such as "numbers of qualified voters, land areas, geography,
miles of.country roads, and taxable values" could be weighed along
with population.' At the other end of the continuum judicially appointed citizen commissions construed the Reynolds formula to mean

that there must not only be numerical equality in population among
the supervisorial districts but also a balance between urban and rural
populations within each district.'
5. Decisions requiring local governments to reapportion were made by state supreme courts in Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164
(1966); Hanlon v. Towey, 274 Minn. 187, 142 N.W.2d 741 (1966); Armentrout v.
Schooler, 409 S.W. 2d 138 (Mo. 1966); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d
778 (1965); Bailey v. Jones, 81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385 (1966); State ex rel. Sonneborn
v. Sylvester, 26 Wis.2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965). Opposing conclusions were reached
only in the cases of Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966); and
Midland County v. Avery, 397 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1965). A sampling of lower federal
court cases instructing local governments to follow the precedent for states include
Strickland v. Burns, 265 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D. Miss. 1966); Ellis v. Mayor of Baltimore, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md.
1964). For an analysis of these cases and the question of Reynold's applicability at the
local level, see 53 VA. L. REV. 953 (1967).
6. Whenever jurisdiction over local apportionment was accepted, strict adherence
to the principle of "one man, one vote" was required as in the case of a subordinate
Michigan court which ruled that, "[a] state may exercise its legislative powers only in a
legislative body apportioned on a population basis and if it delegates a part of those
powers, it must do so to a legislative body apportioned to the same 'basic constitutional
standard'." Brouwer v. Bronkema, No. 1885 (Kent County Mich. Cir. Ct., Sept. 1I,
1964). Apparently this was the first local reapportionment case to be decided after the
Reynolds decision.
7. Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966).
8. Virginia's unique county redistricting procedure, which was eliminated by the
adoption of a new state constitution in 1970, is described in Martin, County Reapportionment in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REV. 1167 (1969).
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The inconsistency of the early lower court decisions regarding
local apportionment can be largely attributed to the imprecise meaning
given the "one man, one vote" principle in the Reynolds case. At that
time the Supreme Court was unquestionably thinking in terms other
than stringent enforcement of the aforementioned principle as a means
of achieving voting equity. On this score it was emphasized that:
[W]e mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State
make an honest and good effort to construct districts in both
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number
of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematicalexactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement. (emphasis
added.) 9
In an effort to underscore the "as nearly as practicable" clause the
Court even went so far as to proclaim that following rigorous mathematical formulas might be impracticable because "indiscriminate districting without any regard for political subdivisions or natural or
historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation
to partisan gerrymandering."10
Concerning state legislative reapportionment, one analysis perceived several possible exceptions deriving from Reynolds v. Sims because:
In a left-handed sort of way the Court did speak in one section of
the Reynolds opinion of several possibly legitimate nonpopulation
considerations: 'insuring some voice to political subdivisons, as
subdivisions'; 'according political subdivisions some independent
representation in at least one body of the state legislature'; following principles of compactness and contiguity in districting;
achiev[ing] 'some flexibility by creating multimember or floterial
districts'; 'effectuat[ing]

. .

. a rational state policy."'

Since local legislatures are frequently comprised of several types of
representation, 2 a reasonable inference was that local government
9. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
10. Id. at 578-79.
11. R.G. DIXON, JR., DEMocRATIc REPRESENTATION: THE LAW AND POUTICS
OF REAPPORTIONMENT 271 (1968).

12. An example would be where the townships contained within a county are each
given a member on the county governing board which also has members elected at-large
from the entire jurisdiction.
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would also be allowed exceptions under the Reynolds doctrine. In contrast another commentator warned against expecting "less stringent
standards" for local units that: "(1) exercise general governmental
functions and (2) are designed to be controlled by the voters of the
geographic area."' 3 To the contrary, he anticipated that the "one man,
one vote" rule would be more rigorously applied to local governments
because unicameral legislatures are used in a limited geographical
area." Considering the range of conjecture and and the pressure of
apprehension and uncertainty under which efforts to achieve greater
local democracy labored, the guidance of national judicial judgment
was badly needed within a few years after the Reynolds pronouncement.
The First Phase
On May 22, 1967, the first cases arising from charges of inequitable representation in local government were unanimously decided by
the Supreme Court, but the answer given for the major issue was
mostly inconclusive. Because of a jurisdictional error in using a three
judge federal court when the challenged law was not of statewide application, two cases, one concerning an Alabama county administrative
board and the other a New York county, were remanded." Therefore,
it could only be assumed in arguendothat the Reynolds concept applied
to all legislative bodies, but the question of its applicability was partially answered in the remaining two decisions. First, in the case of a
Michigan county board, the controversy centered around a state law
providing alternative modes of election. Exercising its option, Kent
County elects the members of its local school boards, each of which
then sends a delegate to a biennial meeting for the purpose of selecting
the county board whose duties are primarily administrative. Impressed
by the essentially nonlegislative character of the county agency coupled
with the fact that its members are not directly elected, the Supreme
Court in Sailors v. Board of EducationI ruled out any application of
'"one man, one vote" for such governing bodies.
13. Weinstein, The Effects of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties
and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. RE V.23 (1965).
14. Id. at 25.

15. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
16. Id.at 105.
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Beyond a doubt the most important of the four cases concerned
the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, which was created in 1964 as a
new entity by the consolidation of an independent city of the same
name with the encompassing county. 17 This new government was municipal only in a legal sense because it contained geographically large,
sparsely populated rural areas. Consequently, in order to provide representation for the diverse interests of this city, an unusual election
scheme combining a residence requirement with an area-wide election
was designed whereby a voter casts eleven ballots to choose a councilman from each of seven boroughs along with four at-large members.
Since the population of the boroughs ranged from 733 to 29,048, the
constitutionality of this plan was subsequently challenged. Relying on
its decision in Fortson v. Dorsey"8 which reasoned that state senators
elected in pursuance of a residence requirement in a multi-district
county were as much the delegates of the entire county as the district
in which they resided, the Supreme Court held that the seven councilmen elected from the boroughs should be similarly regarded, especially
since the "Seven-Four Plan makes no distinction on the basis of race,
creed, or economic status or location."' 9 According to this opinion, it
was assumed that if "Reynolds v. Sims controls, the constitutional test
under the Equal Protection Clause is whether there is an 'invidious'
discrimination" incorporated in election systems.' As long as this
prerequisite for apportionment was not violated, the Justices in another
place indicated a willingness to accept departures from traditional
methods by admitting that "[v]iable local governments may need many
innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great
flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.121 Ostensibly, in an effort to encourage future arrangements such
as the Virginia Beach plan, the Court even went so far as to acknowledge the absence of any constitutional prohibition against experimentation. It was therefore concluded that "[t]he Seven-Four Plan seems to
reflect a detente between urban and rural communities that may be
17. In Virginia, a town with a minimum population of 5,000 may elect to become
a city which functions independently of county government. Consolidations, such as in
the case of Virginia Beach, are authorized by special permission of the state legislature.
18. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
19. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 115 (1967).
20. Id. at 116.
21. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967).
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important in resolving the complex problems of the modern megalop'
olis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside."
Considering the judicial attitude expressed, the immediate reaction to
the Dusch Case was optimistic as its ruling manifested a flexible interpretation of the Reynolds principle particularly when environmental
differences needed to be taken into consideration in achieving legislative equity for different demographic groups. However, later decisions
have dispelled many hopes in this direction.
The Second Phase
Almost one year later on April 1, 1968, the Supreme Court

reversed an order of the Texas Supreme Court za by announcing that
local government representation must be apportioned according to the
mandate of "one man, one vote." 2 In this case the blatant malapportionment could not be defended by even the severest critic of judicial
intervention in the area of essentially political questions because the
four commissioners were elected from districts which in 1963 were
estimated to have populations of 67,906, 852, 823, and 414 with the
largest encompassing practically the entire city of Midland. Since the
concern in state legislative cases had been eliminating dilution of the
vote, it was logical that the pattern of districting in Midland County
should be declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of
the laws, for it would be both inconsistent and unreasonable to use one
application of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state and another for
its subdivisions. To provide a constitutional basis for its decision, the
majority opinion first emphasized that:
The Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state
power however manifested, whether exercised directly or through
municipal subdivisions of the state. . . . Although the forms and
functions of local government and the relationships among the

various units are matters of state concern, it is now beyond question that a State's political subdivisons must comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment. The actions of local government are the

actions of the State. A city, town, or county may no more deny
the equal protection of the laws than it may abridge freedom of
speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable

cause, or deny due process of the law.2"
22.
23.
24.
25.

Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 117 (1967).
See Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966).
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
Id. at 479-80.
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Second, anticipating a potential argument, it was also asserted that
even though the state legislature may be correctly apportioned, elected
local governments are not thereby exempted from the Fourteenth
Amendment because "[w]hile state legislatures exercise extensive
power over their constitutents and over the various units of local
government, the States universally leave much policy and decision
making to their governmental subdivisions. ' 26 Since most states require representative government for local units, the Court concluded
there is "little difference, in terms of the application of the Equal
Protection Clause and of the principles of Reynolds v. Sims, between
the exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by
elected officials in the cities, towns, and counties." Evaluating the
powers of Midland County's Commissioner's Court28 to be similar to
those vested in all elective local governing bodies of general purpose,
the "one man, one vote" theorem was affirmed for this category of
state instrumentalities, but there was evidence of a concern for permitting flexibility in "devising mechanisms of local government suitable
for local needs and efficient in solving local problems." 9 The Supreme
Court significantly qualified its second ruling by noting that "the Constitution imposes only one ground rule for the development of arrangements of local government: a requirement that units with general
governmental powers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population." 0
Although the A very case extended the mandate of "one man, one
vote" to local governments, the vote on the bench was only five to
three .2 However, the dissenters were not in agreement among themselves. To begin with, Justices Harlan and Stewart restated their opposition to their colleagues' assumption of authority over political prob26. Id. at 48 1.
27. Id.
28. This governing body consists of commissioners elected from districts and the
county judge who is elected at-large. The latter serves as chairman and has only a tiebreaking vote.
29. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1967).
30. Id. at 485-86. Actually, the impact of this ruling was not too great because as
reported in the Amicus Curiae brief filed in Sailors v. Board of Education only about
25 per cent of local governing bodies are currently chosen in some manner from districts.
31. Justice Marshall did not participate in this case because he has been involved
in the decisions of May 22, 1967, as Solicitor General of the United States.
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lems such as reapportionment, but the former admitted losing that
battle to the majority in preceding cases. In particular Justice Harlan
vigorously opposed applying the theory of "one-man, one-vote" to
local governments since their problems were perceived as being too
complex for any generalized solution, especially, for example, within a
metropolitan area which requires reconciliation not only of rural and
urban conflict but also recognition of suburban interests.
A contrasting dissent was registered by Justice Fortas who endorsed the Reynolds concept as a guideline for determining representation in state legislatures, but he also challenged its feasibility for districting a state's subdivisions. Using Midland County as an example
of the difficulty inherent in categorizing local governments for reapportionment, it was first pointed out that this county government serves
basically as an administrative agency of the state, and second, that
most of its local functions concern only rural areas since under the
Texas Constitution the City of Midland is given substantial home rule
over its affairs.3 To give his argument more force, Justice Fortas also
emphasized how the power of the commissioner's court is weakened by
the state's assigning certain traditional county responsibilities such as
the assessment and collection of taxes to separate officials who are
elected at-large. As a result of these facts, the Supreme Court's application of "one man, one vote" to the Texas county was criticized because
in this instance a fundamental premise of democracy would be violated
in that the urban population could dominate a government in which it
has an incommensurate interest. Justice Fortas thus thought a better
alternative to the majority's ruling in the case before them would be
giving the State of Texas an opportunity to devise a solution in pursuance of the Equal Protection Clause. Of course, these admonitions were
intended to apply to all local governments in the United States.
The third dissent concurred with the preceding opinion on every
point except its unconditional acceptance of the Reynolds ideology. In
a stinging rebuke to the Court, Justice Stewart rejected the "one man,
one vote" standard on the grounds "that the apportionment of the
legislative body of a sovereign State, no less than the apportionment
of a county government, is far too subtle and complicated a business
to be resolved
as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade
arithmetic. ' '
32. TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
33. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,510 (1967).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss5/3

8

Martin: The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment--The Fourth Phase

19711

LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT

The Third Phase
Following the second phase the next issue needing resolution was
whether a locally elected administrative board or commission of specific authority is subject to the requirement of "one man, one vote".
Since this question was not directly before the Court in A very, it was
deferred with the cognizance that "[w]ere the Commissioners Court a
special purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such bodies
may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens
most affected by the organization's functions." ' Logically, this statement implied that local governments of special powers will be excluded
from the control of Reynolds only in the rare circumstance when there
is concrete evidence proving an unequal rendering of service, a possibility which appears remote because special districts, are almost without
exception, created to serve one purpose within a defined area. However,
this interpretation was disregarded by the Missouri Supreme Court in
a decision concerning the system of unbalanced representation employed in electing trustees for a public junior college district authorized
by the state legislature. Construing the Sailors v. Board oj Education
precedent as including elective as well as appointive boards, it was ruled
that the "one man, one vote" standard was inapplicable inasmuch as
the governing board exercises essentially administrative, not legislative,
power within its jurisdiction.3 Naturally, this case, involving a solution
not yet sanctioned by the highest authority, was appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The challenge in the Hadley case was directed against the disproportionate voice given to the Kansas City School District which is one
of eight such units that voted in a state authorized referendum for
consolidation into the Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas
City. Under state law the latter was governed by six elected trustees
who were apportioned among the individual districts according to their
"school enumeration"; that is, their percentage of population between
the ages of six and twenty years. Although the Kansas City District
34. Id. at 483-84.
35. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 432 S.W.2d 328
(Mo. 1968).
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contained approximately 60 percent of the school enumerationof the
consolidated Junior College District, it was only given three trustees
because the state law provided alternative conditions for selecting a
board. First, if no one of the districts had at least one-third of the total
school population, all trustees were to be elected at-large. Second, if
any district had between one-third and one-half of the total enumeration, it elected two trustees with the remainder being chosen at-large
from the other districts. Third, a district containing between one-half
and two-thirds of the base enumeration elected three trustees with three
being elected at-large. Finally, if the population was more than twothirds, four trustees were allotted to the district with two being selected
at-large."
Recognizing that to a degree Missouri's policy was aimed at
equalizing voting power among units of disparate populations,3" the
Supreme Court still found the scheme defective as it "necessarily results in a systematic discrimination against voters in the more populous
school districts. ' 38 Therefore, the conclusion was that "such built-in
discrimination against voters in large districts cannot be sustained as
a sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate that each person's vote count as much as another's, as far as practicable.""
In addition to the ruling against the challenged plan of apportionment, another important aspect of the Hadley decision was the clarification made concerning how the "one man, one vote" principle should
be applied. To begin with, the appellees' contention that elections
should be categorized according to their significance was quickly dismissed as being contrary to the fundamental right of "each qualified
voter to participate on an equal footing in the election process." 4'1 The
Court believed that the decision to make an office elective signifies its
importance regardless of what powers are exercised. Similarly, the
argument advanced by the appellees for distinguishing between public
36. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 178.800, 178.820 (1965).
37. Regarding the questionable use of school enumeration instead of actual population as the basis for apportionment, the Supreme Court deferred this matter for later
resolution on the grounds that even if school population alone is an acceptable criterion,
the Missouri statute still fell short of constitutional requirements.

38. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50
(1970).
39. Id. at 57.

40. Id. at 55.
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officials according to legislative and administrative duties in order to
exempt elections involving the latter category from the authority of
Reynolds was rejected as imposing an "unmanageable principle" on
the judiciary since there can be such a strict division of governmental
activities. Thus, the general rule was formulated that:
[Wlhenever a state or local government decides to select persons
by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an elected body are
chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on
a basis which will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials."
Yet cognizance was taken of the possibility that "there might be some
case in which a State elected certain functionaries whose duties are so
far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance
with Reynolds might not be required." '4 2 As for the Missouri case,
though, the trustees were not conceived to come under that category
inasmuch as "[e]ducation has traditionally been a vital governmental
function, and these trustees, whose election the State has opened to all
qualified voters, are governmental officials in every relevant sense of
43
that term.
Another salient feature of the Hadley decision was a very deliberate retreat from the rigidity emphasized in the congressional districting
cases44 of the preceding year. Those rulings seemed to require complete adherence to the concept of "one man, one vote" because the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that deviation among district
population is unavoidable if there is to be a "legitimate regard for such
factors as the representation of distinct interest groups, the integrity of
county lines, the compactness of districts, the population trends within
41. Id. at 56.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S.
542 (1969).
45. The implication of these decisions for local government are discussed in Martin,
Local Reapportionment,47 J. OF URBAN L. 352-56 (1970).
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the State, the high proportion of military personnel, college students,
and other nonvoters in some districts, and the political realities of
'legislative interplay.' "46 Instead of allowing any flexibility there was
insistence upon a state making under the "as nearly as practicable"
standard "a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality."4 According to this interpretation, "equal representation for equal
numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of
voting power and diminution of access to elective representatives,"
and it Was further asserted that "toleration of even small deviations
detracts from these purposes." 4" In other words, mathematical exactness overrides all factors in redistricting unless the judiciary believes
variance is justifiable or unavoidable "despite a good-faith effort to
achieve absolute equality." 4 On this score the Hadley majority noted
that '[w]e would be faced with a different question if the deviation from
equal apportionment presented in this case resulted from a plan that
did not contain a built-in bias in favor of small districts, but rather
from the inherent mathematical complications in equally apportioning
a small number of trustees among a limited number of component
districts." 50 And, this opinion reiterated the Reynolds statement about
mathematical exactness not being required with the stipulation that
such a standard would be enforced as long as an electoral system did
hot discriminate against any of its districts. Writing for the majority,
Justice Black again restated the positive attitude expressed in the
Sailors case for permitting experimentation and innovation in designing election mechanisms." In addition reference also was made to the
flexibility endorsed in Dusch v. Davis,5 along with the acceptable practice of appointing officials to administrative boards," and it was even
perceived, though without clarification, that "a State may, in certain
cases, limit the right to vote to a particular group or class of people.""1
46. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
47. Id. at 530-3 1.

48. Id. at 531.
49. Id.
50. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 57-

58 (1970).
51. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 110 (1967).
52. Id. at 112.
53. Supra note 13.

54. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 5859 (1970).
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The immediate conclusion, then, is that the Supreme Court will not
demand a stringent application of the Reynolds axiom for local government, particularly special districts.- However, the inconsistency of national rulings for reapportionment makes one hesitant about making
optimistic predictions.
The vote in the Hadley case was 5 to 3 with Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Harlan and Stewart disagreeing with the conclusion.56
Repeating their opposition to judicial involvement in what they still
regard to be a political question,the latter two jurists first criticized the
extension of the Reynolds philosophy to all elected public bodies in the
United States. Special governments, they contended, should come
under a different rule because, in the words of Justice Harlan:
[T]he need to preserve flexibility in the design of local governmental units that serve specialized functions, and must meet particular
local conditions furnishes a powerful reason to refuse to extend
the Avery ruling beyond its original limits. If local units having
general governmental powers are to be considered, like state
legislatures, as having a substantial identity of function that justifies imposing on them a uniformity of elective structure, it is
clear that specialized local entities are characterized by precisely
the opposite of such identity. From irrigation districts to air pollution control agencies to school districts, such units vary in the
magnitude of their impact upon various constituencies and in the
manner in which the benefits and burdens of their operation interact with other elements of the local political and economic
picture.,
The second part of Harlan's and Stewart's dissent concerned the
Court's failure to define more clearly what is intended by the "as far
as practicable" standard. As a result of this omission Chief Justice
Burger in a short concurring dissent said:
The failure to provide guidelines for determining when the
Court's "general rule" is to be applied is exacerbated when the
Court implies that the stringent standards of "mathematical exactitude" that are controlling in apportionment of federal con55. For a more detailed analysis of the caveats contained in the Hadley decision,
see Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment:The Third Phase, 39 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 102, 115-16 (1970).
56. There was one vacancy on the Supreme Court at the time this case was decided.
57. Hadley v. Junior College dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 6061 (dissenting opinion) (1970).
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gressional districts need not be applied to smaller specialized districts such as the junior college district in this case. . . . Yet the
Court has given almost no indication of which nonpopulation
interests may or may not legitimately be considered by a legislature in devising a constitutional apportionment scheme for a local,
specialized unit of government.--

Although it implicitly approved flexibility, the third phase of local
reapportionment was thus disappointingly incomplete because the formulation of general rules leaves other judges mostly in the dark as to
the proper application of the high court's intention in specific eases.
Obviously, the Supreme Court intended to continue its piecemeal approach to problems of representation.

The Fourth Phase
Part One-Multi-Member Districtingand PopulationInequality
The latest rulings for local reapportionment concern three problems: (1) deviation from population equality among election districts;
(2) multi-member districting; and (3) the requirement of an extraordinary majority in county bond referenda. The first two matters involved
Rockland County, New York, which for more than a century had the
supervisors of its five towns serve ex-officio as the county governing
body.59 This system of representation has served local interests very well

by-producing close cooperation between county and towns in providing
governmental services. For example, a longstanding practice has been
for the towns to prepare their own budgets which are then submitted
to the county. The county levies the necessary taxes that are based on
real property assessments derived by each town, and the county board
equalizes the tax rate for the entire area. Other public services for which
the county coordinates the efforts of the municipalities are waste disposal and snow removal. Not only are current relationships important
to the functioning of government in Rockland County but as the county's population has grown the need for greater cooperation'in the future
has become more evident. However, the increased population caused
severe malapportionment on the county governing body because several
58. Id. at 70-71.
59. This arrangement for determining membership on the county legislature is typical in New York.
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of the towns expanded more rapidly than the others. Therefore, in 1966
a federal district court ordered the county legislature to submit a reapportionment plan to the county voters. 0 Three different proposals were
subsequently rejected at the polls thereby necessitating the preparation
of a representational system similar to the old one which encourages
the town supervisors to also serve on the county board.
Rockland County found the solution to its problem by first establishing five legislative districts which correspond exactly to the five
towns. Then the smallest town, Stony Point with a population in 1969
of 12,114, was assigned one member on the county board. The number
of representatives for the other districts was next ascertained by dividing the 1969 population of each town by that of Stony Point. Naturally, these computations resulted in fractional representation which
had to be rounded to the nearest integer. Consequently, there was a
total deviation from population equality among the districts of 11.9 per
cent. Among these units Clarkstown (5 supervisors) with a population
of 57,883 was over-represented by 4.8 per cent and Harverstraw (2
supervisors) population 23,676, by 2.5 per cent. On the other side of
the ledger Orangetown (4 supervisors) with a population of 52,080 was
under-represented by 7.1 per cent and Ramapo (6 supervisors), population 73,051, by 0.2 per cent.
When Rockland County's multi-member plan of representation
was challenged because of its deviations from population equality, the
New York Court of Appeals in the case of Abate v. Mundt" upheld
the plan's. constitutionality, and the national Supreme Court agreed
with this decision.6" Referring to its previously stated qualifications
regarding the constitutional impracticability of mathematical precision, 3 the emphasis on protecting the integrity of political subdivisions
against the inherent disadvantages of numerical equality, 4 and the need
for flexibility in local arrangements to meet societal needs, 5 the Supreme Court found reinforcement for these caveats in another dimension. Along with the preceding exceptions, it was granted that the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Lodico v. Board of Supervisors, 256 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
25 N.Y.2d 309, 253 N.E.2d 189 (1969).
Abate v. Mundt, 91 S. Ct. 1904 (1971).
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 578-79.
See Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
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population deviations contained in local apportionment structures
should not always be governed by the rules applying to national and
state legislative districting because "local legislative bodies frequently
have fewer representatives than do their state and national counterparts
and . . . some local legislative districts may have a much smaller

population than do congressional and state legislative districts.""6 Yet,
on this score the Supreme Court was unwilling to announce an absolute
rule. Instead, emphasis was placed on allowing an exception to mathematical exactness in assigning representation when the scheme does not
contain a built-in bias on discrimination and when "particular circumstances and needs of a local community as a whole may sometimes
6' 7
justify departures from strict equality.
Writing for the majority Justice Marshall made it clear, however,
that the most crucial aspect of the Abate rule is not the absence of a
built in bias but rather the "particular circumstances and needs of a
local community as a whole." Applying this principle to Rockland
County, the Supreme Court was especially impressed by "the long
history of, and perceived need for, close cooperation between the
county and its constituent towns" 6" and by the county's attempt to
preserve intergovernmental coordination while remedying to a considerable degree to severe malapportionment which had developed in its
old arrangement. As for the second charge that the use of multimember districts violates the Reynolds concept by favoring less populous districts over more populated ones, the Supreme Court answered
in a footnote that the appellees "have not shown that these multimember districts by themselves, operate to impair the voting strength
of particular racial or political elements of the Rockland County voting
population." 9
In a concurring opinion Justice Harlan conceived the result of
Abate v. Mundt coupled with its companion cases of Whitcomb v.
Chavis70 and Gordon v. Lance7 as constituting an implicit rejection of
majoritarianism as a decisional rule for reapportionment. Certainly,
66. Abate v. Mundt, 91 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 (1971).

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1906 n.2.
70. 91 S. Ct. 1858 (1971).
71. 91 S. Ct. 1889 (1971).
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the Whitcomb case, which concerns congressional districting in Indiana, 7 parallels the case of Abate v. Mundt because the issue in both
instances centers around the constitutionality of multi-member districts in legislative apportionment. Nevertheless, the Indiana controversy can be distinguished from that of Rockland County on two
grounds: first the contrast is between an at-large election and the district method used in New York; and second, Whitcomb v. Chavis
involves essentially a charge of racial gerrymandering arising from the
use of multi-member districts. This point is particularly underscored
by the dissenters in Whitcomb who recognized that "[t]he merits of the
case go to the question reserved in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439, and in Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544, [as to] whether a
gerrymander can be 'constitutionally impermissible'." 73 On the other
hand though, there is a strong similarity between the cases under analysis here inasmuch as the Whitcomb majority did conclude that "[i]n
our view

. . .

experience and insight have not yet demonstrated that

multi-member districts are inherently invidious and violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '74 Yet, the case was remanded to the District
Court 7l at which point it is still possible for the challenger to prove
discrimination.
The two dissenters in Abate v. Mundt, Justices Brennan and
Douglas, opposed the decision as a regrettable departure from the
"basic constitutional concept of one-man, one-vote." In their opinion
the governmental arrangement in Rockland County did not justify any
modification of the Reynolds formula enforced in previous cases. However, the dissenters did not believe the impact of the Abate rule would
be very great because "[o]bviously no other local apportionment
scheme can possibly present the same combination of factors relied on
'7
by the Court today.
In conclusion the Abate case must be analyzed with a cognizance
of the Supreme Court's cautious view of the Rockland County plan.
72. For an analysis of the development of this case see Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb:
Apportionment, Gerrymandering, and Black Voting Rights, 24 RUrGERs L. REV. 521
(1970).
73. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 1886 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
74. Id.at 1877.
75. Id. at 1879.
76. Abate v. Mundt, 91 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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Justice Marshall emphasized in the summary that nothing said regarding the variables upon which the Abate decision was based "should be
taken to imply that even these factors could justify substantially greater
deviations from population equality."17 In fact it was indicated that
any questions concerning increases in the deviations among the Rockland County districts can be answered in the future 8 Therefore, the
Abate ruling must be treated as an exceptional circumstance instead
of a reversal in the Supreme Court's application of the "one man, one
vote" rule for local apportionment. More properly, this case should be
placed in the same category as Dusch v. Davis79 for it represents another example of the flexibility endorsed by the Supreme Court in the
Virginia Case.
Part Two-The ExtraordinaryMajority
Although its question does not effect representation, the decision
of Gordon v. Lance"0 does involve an application of the "one man, one
vote" principle to local government. This case concerned West Virginia's constitutional and statutory requirements that all county bond
issues and tax increases be approved by 60 per cent of the county
electorate in a referendum. The challenge against this provision arose
in Roane County where on April 29, 1968, the Board of Education
asked the voters to approve an issuance of general obligations bonds
and an increase in the tax levy. Both proposals were defeated since they
received respectively only 51.55 per cent and 51.5 1per cent of the votes
cast. Subsequently, an appeal was made to the West Virginia Supreme
Court which decided that the 60 per cent requirement was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
a "yes" vote is diluted with a concomitant increase in the weight of a
"no" vote.
In reaching this conclusion the state supreme court relied upon
two precedents pertaining to limitations on the right to vote and to
diluting the power of voting. First, in Gray v. Sanders8' the United
States Supreme Court had declared Georgia's county-unit system un77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1908.
Id. at 1907 n.3.
387 U.S. 112 (1967).
91 S. Ct. 1889 (1971).
372 U.S. 368 (1963).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss5/3

18

Martin: The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment--The Fourth Phase

1971]

LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT

constitutional since a vote in one county carried less value than a vote
in other counties. Second, in Cipriano v. City of Houma82 it had been

held that the right to vote in a revenue bond election could not be
restricted only to property owning taxpayers. In its review of the Roane
County controversy the Supreme Court concluded that the West Virginia court had misapplied the aforementioned precedents because they
denied or diluted voting power on the basis of geography and property
ownership. These factors were not considered as having a valid relation
to the interest the affected groups might have in an election, and in both
Gray and Cipriano the Supreme Court discerned that "the dilution or
denial was imposed irrespective of how members of those groups voted.""' In short, the essence of the Gray principle was reiterated as a
standard protecting the vote against geographic discrimination, while
the Ciprianoruling was restated as being "no more than a reassertion
of the principle, consistently recognized, that an individual may not be
denied access to the ballot because of some extraneous condition, such
as race."8 4 Neither of these defects were found by the Court in the West
Virginia Constitution and statutes.
The crux of the Gordon decision is that first the 60 per cent
requirement is imposed upon all bond issues and that second there is
"no independently identifiable group or category that favors bonded
indebtedness over other forms of financing." ' 5 As a result of these
factors the Supreme Court concluded: "Consequently no sector of the
population may be said to be 'fenced out' from the franchise because
of the way they will vote.""6 As for the difficulty created by the requirement of an extraordinary majority, the Supreme Court admitted that
this procedure gave the minority a disproportionate power in the making of certain governmental decisions, but the Court did not consider
this result to be invalid because "there is nothing in the language of
the Constitution, our history or our cases that requires that a majority
always prevail on every issue." 87 To give currency to this point, reference was made to the decision of Fortson v. Morrisss in which the
Supreme Court had not found anything unconstitutional in the Georgia
provision whereby if no candidate receives a majority of the popular
vote, the governor is elected by the state legislature.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

395 U.S. 701 (1969).
Gordon v. Lance, 91 S. Ct. 1889, 1891 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 1892.
Id.

87. Id.
88. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
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In the Supreme Court's opinion the requirement of an extraordinary majority was legitimized by certain provisions of the United
States Constitution. Obviously, the Gordon majority was impressed by
the argument which had been rejected as inapporpriate and irrelevant
by the West Virginia Supreme Court. It was contended before the state
court that the demand of an extraordinary majority was constitutional
because:
[T]he Constitution of the United States contains many provisions
which are repugnant to the idea of majority rule, including a

provision that ratification of treaties requires a concurrence of
two-thirds of the senators present and voting, requirements pertaining to amendment of the Constitution, and provisions relating
to overriding a veto of a bill by the President.A

In addition to the extraordinary vote provisions of the Constitution,
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, also believed that the
"Bill of Rights removes entire areas of legislation from the concept of
majoritarian supremacy."" This obvious reference to the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of powers to the states was backed up by the
point that the constitutions of many states control in some way the
governmental power to borrow money or to levy taxes. Such protection, it was indicated, has been deemed necessary to protect future
generations from an ill-conceived burden of indebtedness. Whether this
protection was included in the state constitution or was embodied in
statutes was dismissed by the Court as inconsequential, and it declined
to comment on the wisdom of such restrictions because they were
regarded as prerogatives of the states.
The appellee's contention that there is a valid distinction between
a debt limitation changeable only by constitutional amendment and the
restriction against incurring debt unless it is authorized by more than
a majority vote of the legislature was rejected as meaningless. In the
Court's opinion the legislative method might be the easier of the two
since fourteen states require approval of a constitutional amendment
by two consecutive sessions of the legislature before submission to the
people for final ratification. Furthermore, as far as the Supreme Court
was concerned, there is no constitutional difference between the afore89. Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d 783, 790 (W.Va. 1969).
90. Gordon v. Lance, 91 S. Ct. 1889, 1892 (1971).
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mentioned procedures pertaining to governmental debt and one which
leaves the final decision up to the people in a referendum; nor is there
any constitutional difference between the requirement of approval by
more than a majority in a referendum and one which requires approval
by a majority of the registered voters. In fact it was ascertained that
in Roane County's 1968 referendum in which 5,600 of the 8,913 registered voters participated, the requirement of approval by an absolute
majority would have required a "yes" vote on 79 per cent of the ballots
cast. Approval by an absolute majority could, thus, be a more stringent
qualification than the 60 per cent rule.
Following the pattern of the Abate case, the Supreme Court again
cautioned in its conclusion against reading more than was intended into
its decision. A footnote was added at the end to make it clear that the
Gordon ruling applied only to bond referenda as practiced by West
Virginia. This footnote emphasized that:
We intimate no view on the constitutionality of a provision
requiring unanimity or giving a veto power to a very small group.
Nor do we decide whether a State may, consistent with the Constitution, require extraordinary majorities for the election of public
officers."
Two members of the Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall, disagreed with the Gordon decision for the same reasons that West Virginia's Supreme Court had overturned the 60 per cent requirement. They
believed that demanding more than a simple majority violated the "one
man, one vote" standard because an affirmative vote was diluted
whereas the weight of a negative vote was increased.

Conclusion
In his concurring opinion covering all three reapportionment decisions rendered on June 7, 1971, Justice Harlan announced that the
9' 2
Supreme Court was looking for a way out of the "political thicket.
To the contrary, it seems that the Court has partially resolved the
problem of the "thicket" without changing its basic constitutional
philosophy. One obvious result of this latest phase in local reapportionment is that there has not been any relaxation in applying the "one
91. Id. at 1893 n.6.
92. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 1883 (1971) (separate opinion).
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man, one vote" concept. The general rules previously enunciated for
local government will continue to be enforced in the future, and the
retreat from stringency manifested in the Hadley case will probably not
proceed much further than the lenient attitude expressed in Abate toward situational differences. The major tenet in the judicial policy
which now seems to be developing for local apportionment is that the
Court will accept some deviation from population equality in representational schemes which are designed to produce more effective government as long as there is no invidious discrimination being practiced.
Also, the Court will likely continue approving antimajoritarian requirements which have as their purpose protecting against hasty, illprepared action. However, these procedures must be of general application and must not contain any type of discrimination. The significance
then of the Abate and Gordon rulings is that the Supreme Court has
recognized the difficulty of classifying all of local government and
related practices under the Reynolds philosophy.

What problems does the future hold for local apportionment? As
the dissenters in Whitcomb argued, the time has come to ascertain the
constitutionality of political gerrymandering. 3 This nefarious practice
certainly defeats the intention of the "one man, one vote" principle by
reducing the effect a voter can have on the outcome of an election."
Another problem with which the Supreme Court will have to grapple
concerns the matter of counting population for the purpose of districting. In order to eliminate transients such as college students, servicemen and so forth, the City of Los Angeles used only registered voters
as the basis for establishing its fifteen councilmanic districts. As a
result the largest district had nearly 70 per cent more people than the
smallest. Consequently, the California Supreme Court found Los Angeles' method to be constitutionally faulty." Questions such as the
preceding two are examples of the many facets contained in the application of "one man, one vote" to local government. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court's resolution of local
apportionment problems has become an annual event.
93. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 91 S. Ct. 1858 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
94. For some examples of political gerrymandering in local government see Martin,
The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment: The Third Phase, 39 GEO. WAsOl. L.
REV. 102, 120-22 (1970).
95. Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 93 Cal. Rptr. 361,481 P.2d 489 (1971).
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